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Is UK economics teaching changing? Evaluating the new subject 
benchmark statement 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In proclaiming that he wished not to write his nation’s laws but its economics 
textbooks, Paul Samuelson recognised the importance of the governance of 
economics curricula. Such concerns are well established in this journal: O’Leary 
(1942) laid out some principles which all economics curricula might follow. DeShon 
(1970) argued for a radically reformed economics curriculum given the logical flaws 
displayed by standard economic methodology. Zuidhoff (2014) showed how neo-
liberal principles are embedded and reinforced by economics textbooks. Knoop 
(1972) argued for greater prominence of values in economics teaching. Such calls 
have been reinforced, particularly since the global financial crisis highlighted the 
role of questionable professional ethics in precipitating it. DeMartino (2013) argued 
for teaching of professional ethics; however Yalcintas and Selcuk (2015) showed 
that there is little evidence of teaching of research ethics in economics courses. 
Their data suggests little recent change in economics teaching practice, despite 
calls to do so from various quarters. 
 
One important recent driver for change in this arena has been the student 
movement. Earle et al (2016) capture the spirit of this movement in a wide-ranging 
critique of current economics teaching: they make four connected demands with 
regard to economics teaching: 1) greater pluralism of approach to economics; 2) 
the inclusion in economics teaching of societal and political aspects of the 
economy; and 3) a ‘liberal’ education. Thus 4) they demanded fundamental 
change. Teaching changes can be observed at a local level, as individual 
instructors or even departments change their practices. However, change can 
occur at a wider level. For example, the British Academy published Reflections on 
Economics, a report on the state of the art of the discipline and ways to improve it 
(Besley, et al, 2015). A key initiative in this regard has been the CORE Project. 
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While Mearman et al (forthcoming) acknowledge that CORE represents an 
improvement to predecessor curricula1, they evaluate it as not meeting the 
students’ demands. Another key mechanism through which teaching can change 
is via official curriculum governance frameworks. In the UK this framework is 
outlined in the Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics (hereafter SBSE).  
 
This paper will explore the new revision of the SBSE. The new revision was an 
opportunity to (try to) change economics. However, we argue that the SBSE does 
not meet the students’ demands. The SBSE does not deliver greater pluralism. 
Nor does it seek to integrate ethics, power, politics and society into economics 
teaching. Further, it promotes instrumental rather than ‘liberal’ education, and pays 
little explicit heed to educational philosophy. This is a serious flaw given that it is 
unlikely that a new architecture will be successful if its aims are unarticulated. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines our evaluative criteria. 
The criteria are then applied to the SBSE (section 3). The paper then concludes. 
The paper’s findings, though rooted in the UK, have international implications, as 
they may be replicated elsewhere. Wherever there is an existing national 
curriculum for economics, the SBSE could be a model. For those considering how 
to control economics teaching more effectively, the UK approach could provide 
ideas. Thus the evaluation of the SBSE has serious potential consequences. One 
such outcome could be to significantly squeeze space for the principles valued by 
social economy even further. 
 
II. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
 
We evaluate the SBSE according to four criteria, all of which reflect recent 
literature on economics education, and which encompass Earle et al (2016)’s 
                                                 
1 An anonymous referee commented that CORE has presented “grand fundamental changes” to 
a first year economics curriculum. This is representative of many similar claims for the Project. 
However, inter alia Mearman et al (forthcoming), Earle et al (2016), Morgan (2015) have argued 
that CORE offers less actual change than it sometimes claims to do. 
5 
  
recommendations. Hence we provide an integrated critique of the SBSE. The first 
criterion examines the approach to economics embodied within the SBSE. It 
considers pluralism in economics – specifically, how curricular governance 
frameworks reflect degrees of openness to non-mainstream economics and 
uncertainty of knowledge (Freeman, 2009; Dow, 2009; Morgan, 2015). A second 
criterion borrows from a heritage of critical political economy (Lee et al., 2013; 
Andreoni, et al, 2016): it scrutinises treatments of society and power within 
economics curricula. The third criterion utilises Clarke and Mearman’s (2001, 
2003) argument that economics curricula have implicit educational goals and 
philosophy. It interrogates the underlying educational approach(es) of the SBSE. 
The final criterion asks whether the SBSE actually represents a change from the 
current state of affairs in economics curriculum. It builds on existing evaluations 
(Morgan, 2014, 2015).  
 
II.1. Monist or pluralist approach to economics 
 
Our first criterion concerns the approach to economics embodied by the SBSE. 
Here we utilise two distinctions: monism versus pluralism in economics; and 
mainstream versus heterodox economics. Monism here means the insistence that 
there is one way (perhaps broadly defined) to gain insight into the economy. That 
might be in terms of theory, or perhaps method. We also must define ‘mainstream 
economics’. We acknowledge the arguments that mainstream economics is 
changing or fragmented (Cedrini and Fontana, 2017). Nonetheless, here 
mainstream economics is associated with ‘neoclassical’ principles, foremost that 
individuals are rational utility maximisers and that economic entities tend to 
equilibrium. It also tends to prioritise, or for Lawson (1997, et passim) insists on, 
mathematical modelling. ‘Heterodox economics’ is a more elusive concept, but 
typically opposes the principles of mainstream economics and stresses the 
importance of focusing on power and uncertainty in economics (see Dequech, 
2007; Mearman, 2012). It also tends to presuppose an ‘open systems ontology’ 
and therefore a wider range of methods. Combining these two distinctions, one 
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might be a mainstream monist (insisting on, for instance, individualist analysis), or 
a ‘heterodox’ monist (insisting on, say, class analysis).  
 
In turn, pluralism is the advocacy of more than one theoretical or methodological 
perspective. One important argument for pluralism is that it is helpful in 
understanding and addressing events within the complex, open economy (for this 
view see Dobusch and Kapeller, 2012). It might be that economics might become 
more scientific by being openly pluralist. Fullbrook (2016, chapter 1) argues that in 
natural science, there is greater comfort than in economics in shifting between 
what may seem incompatible positions (e.g. quantum mechanics and Einsteinian 
general relativity). Another argument for pluralism might be fallibilism, i.e. the 
possibility of being mistaken about reality. This possibility has been highlighted 
more, because some claim that the crisis was partly caused by the hubris amongst 
economists. Fourcade et al. (2015) speak ironically of the ‘superiority of 
economists’. Caballero (2010) has posited the ‘pretence of knowledge syndrome’ 
and urged that economists show greater epistemological caution. Pluralism is also 
supported for its educational benefits (Stilwell, 2012). Some argue that it may 
engage students better; and possibly equip them better to solve complex problems 
(Nelson, 2009). Pluralism may make graduates more employable by improving skill 
formation (O’Donnell, 2013). Some authors maintain that pluralism allows liberal 
and critical educational goals to be achieved (see section 2.3). Davis and Dolfsma 
(2008) claim that social economics is inherently pluralist. 
 
II.2. Treatment of ethics, power and society within economics 
 
The second criterion concerns the approach taken by economics curricula to the 
nature of economics and the economy. Earle et al. (2016) criticise economics for 
treating the economy as a separate entity, thereby generating theories which 
somehow separate economic aspects from wider society. Consequently, 
considerations of the nature of society are excluded from economics curricula. 
Girardi and Sandonà (2017) show that many students demand that genuine 
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sociality be incorporated in economics teaching. For Davis and Dolfsma (2008) 
economic relationships are at bottom social. So, we ask whether the SBSE admits 
this element into its vision of economics. Further, we explore how the SBSE 
considers power in economics which, arguably has until now been largely excluded 
from mainstream economics (for this view see Ozanne 2016). Where it is included, 
power is not conceived as intrinsic to social constitution and interaction but only in 
the limited sense of distortion of an equilibrium process or of the potential of an 
adverse market structure (compared to some ideal unreal point unattainable 
situation).  
 
We also consider whether or not political or ethical aspects of economics are 
acknowledged. The discipline’s retention of the fact/value distinction makes this 
controversial. According to this positive economic position, a staple of introductory 
economics courses, economists qua (social) scientists and educators ought to 
exclude their political views in their practice. This is hard to defend. Veblen (1919) 
and Myrdal (1930) show that economics abounds with implicit, perhaps even 
intentionally hidden ethical principles and culturally determined concepts. These 
concerns are significant to social economists, as they relate to values, and to 
professional ethics (DeMartino, 2013). More fundamentally, social economics 
“emphasises the connection between economics and ethics, where ethics 
concerns how values are inescapably intertwined with social relationships” (Davis 
and Dolfsma, 2008, p. 2). 
 
II.3. Educational goals and approaches 
 
Our third criterion concerns educational philosophy and practice. Peters (1970, p. 
28) argues that an examination of educational aims must precede any discussion 
of curriculum content or teaching process, as ‘a way of getting people to get clear 
about and focus their attention on what is worthwhile achieving’. Clarke and 
Mearman (2001), though, argue that economists have neglected educational 
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goals. Instead, the focus of economics education literature is on either content or 
process.  
 
We deploy three broad strands of educational goals in the literature: instrumental, 
liberal, and critical. From Bridges (1992), instrumental education aims that 
students are trained in concrete, identifiable skills, such as the ability to solve 
certain types of problems, know formulae or techniques, remember and, perhaps, 
apply theory, or possess ‘knowledge’ of a topic. All education will involve 
instrumental outcomes, even if they are not intended: students learn facts, for 
example. However, an education geared towards such instrumental goals is 
‘instrumentalist’. Therefore, an education in which a learner is uncritically exposed 
to only one theoretical perspective and its behavioural ideal is instrumentalist. Any 
educational process may be instrumentalist if its content is delivered uncritically. 
 
By contrast, the central feature of liberal education is ‘to equip people to make their 
own free, autonomous choices about the life they will lead’ (Bridges, 1992). Hence 
the goal is that students develop the intellectual capacities of critical, evaluative 
and comparative thinking, and intellectual open-mindedness. Hence curriculum 
content should be assessed according to its ability to achieve these outcomes. The 
learning of facts is de-emphasised. Arguably these desired capacities are achieved 
better in a pluralist curriculum than in a monist one, as pluralism should incorporate 
contrast and criticism of one view by another (Mearman et al., 2011). Liberal 
education may have several benefits for learners; however, liberal educational 
philosophy is vulnerable to the critiques that it is individualist. Further, Mirowski 
(2013) warns that under neoliberalism, the debate favoured by liberal teachers has 
an agnotological function that is to create doubt by means of science, thereby 
blunting transformative social action.  
 
Critical pedagogy has been developed by, for example Freire (1970). It has been 
promoted by radical political economists (Bridges and Hartmann, 1975; Rose, 
2005). It is rooted particularly in critical theory. Critical pedagogy generally rejects 
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modernist (Enlightenment) education, therefore including liberal education. It aims 
to liberate those oppressed and excluded by the system. In practice, this involves 
the process of conscientisation, in which everyday concepts are evaluated and re-
evaluated critically. Critical pedagogy is thus student-centred. A fortiori, the content 
of the curriculum should stress the contributions of oppressed groups. This partly 
resonates with liberal goals; however, critical pedagogy provides the necessary 
space for students to, for example, struggle with ongoing relations of power 
(Visano, 2016). 
 
Some caveats must be noted. First, whilst the framework presented covers much 
of the territory of educational philosophy, it is not exhaustive. Second, here we 
have presented the three educational philosophies as analytically distinct for 
convenience; but in reality, they overlap. For example, liberal education is clearly 
somewhat instrumentalist as it implies a vision of society. Similarly, critical 
pedagogy can encompass an objective of changing society. As already noted, 
liberal and critical education share the goal of empowering learners. Third, a good 
educational programme may contain elements of each of the three perspectives 
(albeit in context-specific combinations). However, bearing in mind these caveats 
we will use the framework as presented, to evaluate the SBSE.  
 
II.4. Extent and nature of change 
 
The criteria laid out in sections II.1-II.3 capture how we intend to evaluate the 
extent and nature of change represented by the SBSE. Moreover, the three criteria 
are connected. A more pluralist approach (criterion 1) would facilitate a broad 
treatment of societal aspects of economics, including power (criterion 2). That 
follows because the heterodox traditions tend to embrace those broader aspects. 
Further, greater pluralism might imply a more critical approach to education 
(criterion 3). Additionally, we must state our premise that the status quo ante of 
economics teaching is monist (neoclassical), in which the socio-political 
dimensions of economics are largely excluded, and educational goals are opaque 
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and instrumental. Thus for the SBSE, our evaluation of change (criterion 4) will 
concern whether it has become more pluralist, addresses socio-political 
dimensions of economics, and make explicit educational goals inclusive of a non-
instrumental approach.  
 
We now apply these criteria to the Economics benchmark statement (SBSE).   
 
III. THE SUBJECT BENCHMARK STATEMENT IN ECONOMICS 
 
Subject Benchmark Statements (SBS) are important elements of the regulatory 
environment in UK higher education. They provide a context and a set of guidelines 
for the delivery of degree programmes. They define ‘what can be expected of a 
graduate in the subject, in terms of what they might know, do and understand at 
the end of their studies’ (SBSE, p. 1). Further, SBSs are ‘used as reference points 
in the design, delivery and review of academic programmes. They provide general 
guidance for articulating the learning outcomes associated with the programme but 
are not intended to represent a national curriculum in a subject or to prescribe set 
approaches to teaching, learning or assessment’ (p. 2). There is a set of SBSs, 
which share similarities but also sometimes exhibit significant variation. Our 
present task is to assess the most recent draft of the SBS for Economics in terms 
of our four key questions.  
 
III.1. Is the SBSE pluralist? 
 
The SBSE is written by a panel. Significantly, the composition of the 2015 panel 
was broader than in previous incarnations. Alongside mainstream academic 
economists were various other constituencies, including specific educational 
expertise (Alvin Birdi, Economics Network director) and heterodox experts in 
finance, Daniela Gabor (UWE, Bristol) and Neil Lancastle (De Montfort). The 
impact of the latter two is evident through greater emphasis on finance and money; 
and critical thinking. Lancastle also linked formally to several students from the 
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Rethinking Economics group who were present. Bringing the perspective of the 
UK’s largest employer of economists was the former deputy director of the 
Government Economic Service, Andy Ross. His impact is evident via a new 
paragraph on employers’ needs. Overall, this new panel augured a radically 
different, more pluralist and epistemologically cautious document. 
 
However, there was no requirement for the SBSE to be pluralist, or to become 
pluralist. SBSs merely ‘allow for flexibility and innovation in programme design 
within a framework agreed by the subject community’ (SBSE, p. 2, emphasis 
added). As the italicised phrase suggests, the SBSE expresses a view from the 
discipline of itself. There is clearly scope to show that economics can become a 
pluralist subject – as other disciplines do – or that it had responded to demands 
for pluralism by shifting its perspective either by explicitly adopting greater variety 
of approach and/or by displaying greater epistemological caution. Indeed, as 
Lancastle (2015) reports, at the outset of the discussion, the Committee Chair 
declared that ‘we are all pluralists now’, suggesting sufficient will to change the 
document.  
 
What evidence is there that the SBSE has become more pluralist? Overall, we 
argue that the document suggests more openness, including a more descriptive 
tone and greater evidence of epistemological caution. Unfortunately, the document 
gives as it takes away: the openness is superficial, the caution is undermined by 
hubris, and the descriptive tone may actually have a dogmatic aspect. 
 
First, SBSE section 2.2 contains a rather pluralist injunction: ‘Various 
interpretations of commonly observed economic phenomena exist, and hence 
explanations may be contested. It is therefore important that...theories are 
evidence-based, using quantitative and qualitative data analysis’ (p. 5). The 
statement appears significantly open. It hints at both greater tolerance of 
alternatives and a recognition that established ideas may be fallible. These 
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implications would be important given criticisms of economics as monist and 
hubristic. 
 
However, acknowledging pluralism minimally, in some circumstances, is not the 
same as enabling pluralism. Merely referring to alternatives is weak. A course 
could satisfy the injunction to examine alternative approaches by offering merely 
two very similar interpretations of a phenomenon from the same school of thought. 
While economics as a discipline is changing and exhibits a great diversity, in its 
teaching established schools of thought considered ‘heterodox’, such as Post 
Keynesianism, Marxism and Institutionalism are not mentioned. There is certainly 
no injunction to engage meaningfully with them. Far from proclaiming that ‘we are 
all pluralists now’, the SBSE provides scant grounds for pluralism.  
 
Second, an alternative perspective on the earlier SBSEs was that their main 
problem was not monism, but overconfidence. Given the weight attributed to the 
hubris of economists (and their employers in finance) in many explanations of the 
crisis, greater humility was warranted and perhaps expected. One of the effects of 
the threat to credibility suffered by economists might be that this confidence was 
eroded. Let us investigate whether the SBSE supports this thesis.  
 
There is evidence of an epistemological shift in the SBSE. The document now 
contains many references to the importance of historical context. For example, 
SBSE section 2.2 states: it is ‘important that economic phenomena are studied in 
their relevant historical, political, institutional, international, social and 
environmental contexts’ (p. 5). This is significant because it suggests results are 
less likely to be universal. Similarly, the document’s new references to criticality – 
including in its summary of changes – might be interpreted as representative of 
greater epistemological caution. Specifically, section 3.1 refers to being critical 
about the specific assumptions being made in economic modelling. Section 4.1ii 
now acknowledges that different methods have strengths and weaknesses. 
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Section 5.4iii includes an additional clause emphasising the need for caution about 
data sources.  
 
Further, ‘...economists learn not to be misled by numbers or the selective use of 
data. They question whether the numbers represent what they claim, they 
understand statistical significance and they are aware of at least some of the 
difficulties in sampling a population. In addition, with some understanding of 
econometrics, they recognise that conclusions drawn from data might be 
ambiguous’ (section 5.5, p. 6). This again suggests an epistemological shift.  
 
However, the statement is guilty of omission and of smuggling in priorities. For 
instance, it retains a stress on statistical significance and makes no explicit 
acknowledgement of substantive economic significance. This is problematic 
because it reinforces the notion that technical expertise trumps an engagement 
with reality. Second, while recognition that ‘conclusions drawn from data might be 
ambiguous’ is commendable, data analysis is implicitly equated with econometrics. 
There is no reference in the document to other types of data analysis, despite their 
being increasingly employed and recognised as useful by economists. Proposed 
re-wording to encompass qualitative and mixed-methods research was rejected by 
the SBSE committee (Lancastle, 2015). Hence, without justification, a relative 
prominence is still given to mathematics and computing techniques (section 4.1iii). 
As Morgan (2015, p. 532) argues, this position renders economics less able to 
generate adequate scientific accounts of phenomena, which require economists 
to ‘seek out and use all relevant methods’ (emphasis added).  
 
Other statements undermine further the sense of an epistemological shift and 
hence claims to pluralism. Whilst there is greater awareness that economics is 
under external scrutiny – for instance its opening statements refer to its audience 
– the document’s humility could be stronger. An exemplar of this is SBSE’s attempt 
to outline the nature of economics. The document claims that economics has a 
‘distinctive nature’ (1.1, p. 5). Further, it states (2.1, p. 5): 
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‘Economics is the study of the factors that influence income, wealth 
and well-being. From this it seeks to inform the design and 
implementation of economic policy. Its aim is to analyse and 
understand the allocation, distribution and utilisation of resources 
and the consequences for economic and social well-being.’.  
 
Now, this statement could be regarded as relatively benign. Most economists might 
agree that economics concerns those factors and topics, notwithstanding 
disagreement about the importance of allocation (to some economists) and 
distribution (to others). However, in comparison with other disciplines, economics 
appears more dogmatic. Freeman (2009) juxtaposes the SBSE with its counterpart 
for Theology and Religious Studies (TRS), which one might expect to be more 
prone to dogma. In fact, TRS appears much less certain about its purpose and 
identity, stressing that it ‘...may be characterised as a family of methods...’ 
(QAAHE, 2007b, p. 05, emphasis added).  
 
Further contrasts are illustrative. Physics, for example, is a discipline that has been 
aped by mainstream ‘neoclassical’ economists who, however, do not follow the 
behaviour of physicists of actually abandoning wrong theories (Mirowski, 2002). 
The SBS for Physics, Astronomy and Astrophysics (QAAHE, 2016) notes that 
‘Physics is a continually evolving discipline that has theoretical, computational and 
experimental aspects; [and that] many physicists span these categories’. It also 
recognises its interdisciplinary nature. Biology has also inspired economics, 
though not the current mainstream ‘neoclassical’ economics. Its SBS (QAAHE, 
2007c) states: ‘Study of the biosciences involves a multidisciplinary approach to 
the understanding of life processes. Complexity and the relationship between form 
and function are intrinsic to the biosciences’. This may seem to restrict debate and 
exclude reductionism; however the passage continues: ‘Although some biologists 
strive to reduce complex systems to their simplest components, all acknowledge 
that they are ultimately working with organisms whose complexity is fundamental 
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to their life, difficult to understand and greatly influenced by their environment’. 
Finally, in its SBS, mathematics (QAAHE, 2007d) is portrayed as a vast subject 
with numerous applications. And, though it is based around principles of 
abstraction, generalisation and deduction, the SBS does not prescribe beyond that 
and explicitly recognises the history of the subject and the relevance of earlier 
mathematics (7). These role-model sciences appear, compared to economics, 
somewhat more open and cautious. 
 
Third, significantly, there has been a linguistic shift in the SBSE to a more 
descriptive (and ostensibly more contingent) tone: from stating what students will 
normally learn to what they would usually learn (SBSE, section 4.1). Furthermore, 
in SBSE section 3.1, an aim of undergraduate programmes is to ‘foster an 
understanding of alternative approaches to the analysis of economic phenomena’. 
Also, less stress is now placed on the core neoclassical concept of scarcity that 
many heterodox economists reject (see Lee, 2000). Of further significance was the 
removal of the term ‘a coherent core of economic principles’ (2007a) (p. 7) in favour 
of ‘Economic concepts, principles and tools’ (section 4.1i). These examples may 
reflect an implicit objective to describe rather than prescribe economics. That 
seems promising. 
 
However, the apparent shift towards a more descriptive tone instead of having a 
prescriptive purpose may disguise dogmatism. The SBSE presents a core, or 
‘mainstream’, which fits the majority of the discipline, granting only limited room 
and prestige to dissenting perspectives. By defining what is ‘usual’, one can 
exclude. They facilitate insults against heterodox economists that their work is not 
core economics, or worse, not economics at all. These serve to confer opprobrium 
on them and status on others. Whereas prescription works via fiat, description 
works via norms, conventions, and other subtle forms of power.  
 
Another rationale for descriptivism is if the power of the regulatory document is 
weak. In the case of the SBSE, its power is limited by a number of factors. Its 
16 
  
preamble stresses that it has advisory and informative purposes and is not 
intended as a framework akin to a national curriculum (which is explicitly 
proscribed). Specifically, SBSs are ‘reference points in the design, delivery and 
review of academic programmes...[which] provide general guidance for articulating 
the learning outcomes associated with the programme...[and] allow for flexibility 
and innovation in programme design within a framework agreed by the subject 
community’ (p. 2, emphasis added). This begins to suggest that though it is 
permissive, the power of the SBSE is small. 
 
What actually gets taught in departments reflects greatly the desires of the staff 
within them (see Clarke and Mearman, 2003). However, the composition of staffing 
is driven mainly not by teaching but by research. Lee et al. (2013, p. 714) show 
that research assessment has biased hires in UK departments towards 
mainstream mathematical modelling, thereby narrowing theoretical pluralism 
therein by reinforcing the mainstream preference for mathematical economists. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that intellectual history, methodology or a pluralist 
approach will take root in teaching. So there are institutional constraints (and 
enablements) on the governmental, legislative, disciplinary and local levels acting 
on academics who construct curricula or courses. Not least, promotion routes and 
criteria reinforce existing biases. Against this backdrop, the SBSE document 
remains rather impotent and likely to be overridden.  
 
In conclusion, despite apparent shifts in tone and content, the SBSE does not 
deliver greater pluralism. In the next section we argue that this is manifest in the 
SBSE’s treatment of socio-political factors and ethics (section III.2). This has 
significant implications for the prospects of social economics and other heterodox 
approaches. The lack of pluralism is reinforced by a lack of engagement with 
educational philosophy and practice, as discussed in section III.3.  
 
III.2. How does the SBSE treat ethics, power, politics and society within 
economics? 
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We now consider how the SBSE appears to treat ‘the economy’, and then how it 
deals with social, political and ethical dimensions of economics. The first point to 
note is that the SBSE does not offer an explicit ontological vision. However, 
atomistic ontological presuppositions are implied in its treatment of the macro level 
as an aggregation (SBSE, section 2.2). Nonetheless, the SBSE clearly recognises 
that the economy sits in a context: ‘It is therefore important that economic 
phenomena are studied in their relevant historical, political, institutional, 
international social and environmental contexts...’ (SBSE section 2.2). 
Unfortunately, reflecting prevailing approaches within the discipline, the SBSE 
treats the economy as a strictly separate entity. A fortiori, economics is treated as 
a rather separate social science. Thus, the SBSE maintains a very clear sense of 
what economics is (section 2.1), and that it has a “distinctive nature” – its 
boundaries are still clear enough to make this claim – or at least, economists’ 
abilities remain sufficient to identify correctly the boundaries. This allows one to 
continue to delineate strictly what is economic (and what is not). In this way it is 
fundamentally different from how a social economist would look at it. 
 
For example, in the key skill of ‘framing’ (SBSE section 5.4iv) the student should 
understand a problem’s parameters and how these might change. Further, this 
‘encourages a student to place the economic problem in its broader social and 
political context’. Moreover, in assessment, instructors are guided to consider 
‘[h]ow successfully ... students [have] used evidence and knowledge of historical, 
political, institutional, international, social and environmental contexts...’ This 
seems reasonable; however, in considering another key skill, ‘abstraction’, the 
student’s objective is to ‘provide a useable framework for evaluation and 
assessment of the effects of policy or other exogenous events’ (section 5.4i, 
emphasis added). The approach also maintains the assumption that the 
‘economic’ aspects can be separated easily from the complex whole. Further, ‘non-
economic’ events are still considered ‘exogenous’, rather than, say, political and 
cultural factors being mutually constitutive with the economic. To treat policy as an 
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exogenous event, for instance, ignores the extensive deployment of economists 
from all aspects of modern government.  
 
Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest that social, environmental, political, 
power, and ethical dimensions are considered inherent to economics: rather these 
are treated as external shocks, whose internal effects are to be explored. The 
SBSE seems to exclude the wider and more complex nature of economic 
interactions and of economics itself. Indeed, politics is largely absent. The word 
‘power’ is not used in the SBSE. Key issues such as inequality are implied (as 
‘income distribution’) but not explicitly discussed or emphasised. Here, then, the 
demands of many for more explicit consideration of the socio-political dimensions 
of economics have been ignored, demonstrating a failure to address significant 
responses to student and academic calls for more pluralism and real-world 
application of economic theories.  
 
Further, we see little evidence that the SBSE reflects another recent shift in 
economics towards interdisciplinarity. The nature of the interaction between 
economics and other disciplines remains rather superficial, selective and, in some 
ways, still imperialistic. Consider how the SBSE defines economics. This has 
implications for the relation of the subject to other disciplines. The document now 
says that, ‘Economics ... draws on and influences other social sciences. It also 
links with other subject areas such as ethics, finance, geography, history, 
international relations, law, philosophy and psychology. It uses and interacts with 
mathematical and statistical methods and sciences such as environmental 
science, biology and medicine’ (SBSE, section 2.3). The list of disciplines is salient. 
Explicit reference to politics and sociology has been removed; whereas ethics has 
been added in. However, though the document does mention conflict of interest, 
this is at a conceptual level. Significantly, despite a recent public focus on it, the 
SBSE does not refer to professional ethics.  
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The document’s treatment of ethics is significant. Economics links to ethics (2.3). 
Any notion that economics is inherently ethical is absent. More broadly, the SBSE 
makes no explicit reference to normative judgement or positions – and certainly 
avoids any suggestion that economics is inherently value-laden. The sole use of 
the word ‘value’ refers to what employers may want in graduates (3.1, 5.2). The 
absence of this term is further evidence of the SBSE’s weak pluralism: value is, 
after all, a foundational concept in economics. Further, the SBSE contains no 
reference to morality. References to welfare are exceptions, but again there is no 
explicit discussion of welfare as being utilitarian or that there are alternative 
conceptions of well-being. Indeed the latter is treated as synonymous with income 
and wealth (2.1).   
 
Approached in this way, economics is not a moral, ethical, political or social 
discipline per se. This is clearly antithetical to social economics, for which “ethics 
concerns how values are inescapably intertwined with social relationships” (Davis 
and Dolfsma, 2008, p. 2). One way to have dealt with this matter more effectively 
would have been, drawing on section 3.1, to become more pluralist by 
incorporating heterodox economics perspectives. Much of heterodox economics 
acknowledges that the economy is about who we are as human beings and how 
we should live our lives and this involves normative judgments. These have to be 
made explicit and reasoned out vis-à-vis the alternatives (see for example, Lee 
and Cronin, 2016; and Jo et al, 2017).  
 
III.3. What are the SBSE’s educational goals and approach? 
 
We have argued in section III.1 that the new SBSE is not noticeably more pluralist. 
Further, its entrenched monism manifests in an inadequate treatment of power and 
politics in economics (section III.2). These outcomes reflect the structures of the 
economics discipline; however, they need not mean that economics teaching has 
to be so narrow. A way to counteract that would be for economics educators to 
adopt a more pluralist approach. One way to inspire that pluralism would be to 
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adopt a liberal or critical educational philosophy. Unfortunately economics 
educators have shown little explicit recognition of, or concern for, educational 
philosophy. Accordingly, we argue that the SBSE is weak on its explicit discussion 
of educational goals while implicitly adopting a mostly instrumentalist stance 
focused on the development of knowledge and skills.  
 
Further, although there seems to be a commitment to the development of students’ 
skills, there is misunderstanding about these skills. Specifically, there appears to 
be confusion between subject-specific and transferable skills. The SBSE identifies 
four key subject-specific skills: abstraction, framing, reasoning, and quantification. 
It is clear that none of these is either specific to economics, or derived from it. The 
impression of confusion is reinforced by the SBSE’s use of the notion of 
‘transferable skills’. At this point (section 5.5i), the document identifies inter alia 
opportunity cost, incentives, expectations, equilibrium, and marginal analysis as 
transferable. On the contrary, these are clearly subject-specific – and indeed draw 
on one economic paradigm – which the document fudges by using the phrase 
‘transferable application of economic concepts’. The document claims that 
‘[s]tudents in economics are exposed to these issues and this enhances their 
potential effectiveness as decision-makers’ (p. 9). The muddle is further evidenced 
by the fact that, although quantification is regarded as a subject-specific skill, 
section 5.6 (correctly) identifies ‘numeracy’ as a transferable facet. These 
examples suggest that the SBSE’s engagement with educational theory and 
philosophy could be stronger. 
 
Beyond this, it seems that the implicit educational philosophy of the document is 
instrumental. This can be inferred from statements within the document, and 
omissions from it. Let us examine the stated aims of the SBSE. These are mainly 
instrumental. Section 3.1 begins with a statement that economics degrees are 
about ‘education and training in economic concepts, theories, ideas and tools, and 
their application’ (p. 6). However, this is the only use of the word ‘education’ in the 
document, whereas training appears four times. Indeed, the word education was 
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absent in 2000, 2007, and the first draft of the 2015 document, only being inserted 
after critical discussion within the group. This reinforces the impression that the 
SBSE – and hence economics curricula – aims merely at training students. While 
the SBSE contains references to evaluation, these are in all but one case explicitly 
about policy. While the document proclaims that a commitment to critical thinking 
has been strengthened, these changes come late in the document. 
 
The SBSE remains relatively dogmatic about the nature and content of economics. 
It appears relatively prone to defining problems and ways of considering them in 
narrow ways. A stress remains on assessing particular types of evidence using 
particular tools, which are geared towards proficiency in data handling rather than 
genuine deep, critical engagement with evidence. All of this is underpinned by a 
lack of acknowledgment of fundamental uncertainty in economics and fundamental 
disputes regarding economic knowledge claims. The SBSE makes gestures 
towards a different vision, but does so in tokenistic and superficial ways. Hence, 
the possibilities for pluralist critical thinking are lost. All of this runs contrary to 
liberal and critical education and buttresses the impression of instrumentalism. 
 
The instrumentalism of the document is reinforced in its increased focus on 
employability. Employability was always present; however, the addition of section 
5.2 to the 2015 document is significant. The section stresses many prosaic skills 
such as report writing and communication; but also ‘knowledge of economic history 
and its context...pluralistic perspectives and interdisciplinary synthesis, to inform 
an application of critical judgement’ (p. 9). This section, again, contains the 
potential for a pluralist, liberal or critical approach to economics education – but 
one which also has instrumental benefits to employers and society at large. As 
Clarke and Mearman (2004) argue, liberal goals can be consistent with 
employability if the latter does not focus too heavily on rote learning or repetitive 
training. Further, as noted in section II.3, it is likely that an educational programme 
will combine ‘liberal’, ‘critical’ and ‘instrumental’ objectives; however, there is no 
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indication in the SBSE that this combination is being pursued consciously or 
achieved knowingly.  
 
One possible defence of the SBSE’s approach to educational philosophy might 
be that the document itself does not allow for such explicit statements. In both 
the SBSE and the SBS for Business and Management (QAAHE, 2015), section 2 
covers the nature and extent (or scope) of the subject. However, within that 
section, there is scope for subject-specific variation. So, the Business and 
Management SBS addresses specifically “improved self-awareness and personal 
development” (section 2.2), and “the encouragement of positive and critical 
attitudes towards change and enterprise” (section 2.3). Further, that defence 
presupposes that had the opportunity arisen, the SBSE would have taken it. This, 
however, seems unlikely. As Mearman et al (forthcoming) show, in another 
recent curricular development, the CORE Project, there is little meaningful 
explicit engagement with educational philosophy; and the educational approach 
implicit seems to be geared towards training rather than open-ended enquiry.  
 
III.4 Does the SBSE represent change? 
 
While the SBSE offered an opportunity for significant change, it was not required 
to deliver that. Some change in the document was inevitable, as stipulated by the 
QAAHE. However, the structure of the document conformed to a standard for all 
subject benchmarks. In some ways, then, the SBSE committee was limited in its 
scope to change the document. Nonetheless, we might have predicted that the 
2015 SBSE would be significantly different from its predecessors, given the make-
up of the panel and, particularly, in the context of the economic crisis which had 
occurred since the 2007 edition and the unprecedented criticism of economics 
which it triggered. Indeed, a February press release was headed ‘QAA debate 
signals fundamental change in the study of economics’ (Morgan, 2015: p. 520). 
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Largely, though, this promise was confounded. The most striking thing about the 
original draft of the document was how similar it was to its predecessor. 
Subsequent debate within the group led to the inclusion of newer material, for 
instance on employability. Nonetheless, arguably, the SBSE fails even to capture 
many developments in mainstream research. Despite its role as one of the 
contributing factors to the economic crisis, finance remained largely ignored. 
Further, the ecological crisis was still essentially omitted. Despite considerable 
noise about history, there was relatively little about it. As Lancastle (2015) notes 
‘Students are asked to ‘appreciate history (of economic thought)’ but not to 
understand it’. For those expecting fundamental change, the SBSE was 
disappointing. However, for those inside the process, perhaps only gradual change 
was politically feasible. 
 
We have also examined the claim (made privately) of proponents of the SBSE that 
it contains an epistemological shift, in which declarations which in previous 
versions of the SBSE were bold, are presented more cautiously. There is some 
evidence for this. However, the changes of language in the SBSE may be so subtle 
as to be lost; and indeed other bolder statements contradict them, undermining 
any epistemological shift they might convey. There seems to be little reduced 
confidence in economists to make claims about how the economy works, or how 
one would know this. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has explored the revision of the UK SBSE, an opportunity for 
economics to demonstrate the major curricular change that was demanded by 
students (Earle, et al 2016), government and the wider public. However, we have 
argued that the new SBSE falls short of these expectations. Indeed, seemingly it 
goes even less far than does the CORE Project, in terms of updating the 
curriculum, or Besley et al (2015)’s recommendations that much greater explicit 
attention be paid to interdisciplinarity, particularly politics and history. 
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In the language of our evaluative criteria, the SBSE continues to exhibit limited 
pluralism, either in terms of openness to fundamentally different alternatives, or to 
the possibility that the dominant view might be wrong. In teaching this is a 
significant deficiency as it limits the achievement of key educational goals such as 
the development of core cognitive faculties. Furthermore, the SBSE is limited in 
creating the environment for a meaningful engagement with the wider social-
political, and ethical, nature of economics. Nonetheless, this deficiency could be 
addressed if the SBSE paid explicit attention to educational philosophy. 
Unfortunately, our analysis suggests that the SBSE pays scant explicit attention to 
the educational purpose of economics teaching. This is a fundamental problem: 
‘Instructors simply function in a fog of their own making unless they know what 
they want their students to accomplish as a result of their instruction’ (Mager 
quoted by Curzon, 1990, p. 131). As such, the SBSE does exhibit some change; 
however, it is remarkably similar to its previous incarnation. This inertia reflects 
disciplinary structures and reinforces the theoretical and methodological monism 
within the discipline. In these senses, the SBSE presents change in order to stay 
the same. These are crucial findings in understanding how governance structures 
change; or how and why they do not change. The issues raised therefore resonate 
beyond the UK context. 
 
Our concerns about the SBSE resonate particularly strongly with social 
economists. As, for instance, Davis and Dolfsma (2008) suggest, social economics 
has been inherently pluralist. They note that “social economists have a variety of 
additional orientations, including institutionalism, Marxism, feminism…” (p. 4). As 
we have seen the document creates little space for these perspectives or for social 
economics itself. Second, social economists are interdisciplinary, yet the SBSE is 
selective in its engagement with other disciplines. This problem is manifest in the 
SBSE’s treatments of society and ethics. Social economists “treat the economy as 
fundamentally social” (p. 2), whereas in the SBSE there is little sense of the 
economic being embedded in the social. Further, social economics “… 
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emphasises the connection between economics and ethics, where ethics concerns 
how values are inescapably intertwined with social relationships” (p. 2). As we 
have argued, the SBSE does not do this. As such, the SBSE seems unlikely to 
facilitate the development of social economists, who seek to understand “the deep 
underlying social-value principles that encompass and guide the entire social 
economy” (p. 5). 
 
A starting point for the needed fundamental change would be to focus on its 
educational (and therefore broader societal) objectives. Liberal education 
demands that students develop critical thinking, autonomy, and wisdom. 
Incidentally, these also serve the purposes of fostering insightful citizens and able 
workers. However, those objectives may not be well-served if the objectives of 
economics educators are mainly to produce the next generation of neoclassical 
researchers. Instead, one might imagine economists to be specialists seeking to 
solve practical problems. Pluralism may play an important role here, as a vehicle 
for developing flexible, critical thinking and developing multiple bases of knowledge 
when solving complex problems. That might in turn reduce the perceived dis-
connection between economists and their various constituents both inside and 
outside of academia, ranging from the public to students and other academic fields. 
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